摘要：运用演化博弈研究我国公共文化设施项目参建方之间的博弈关系，分别构建项目业主方内部以及业主方与施工方之间的支付矩阵，对两组演化模型中的策略组合进行稳定性分析，并用数值仿真演示参数变化对业主方与施工方博弈演化趋势的影响。结果表明：业主方群体受利益驱动会逐渐趋向于选择违规操作，而政府监管体系的监管效力会受到监管成本的制约。“对业主方的正向激励”，“业主方的监管成本”，“对施工方偷懒的惩罚”三个参数影响了业主方与施工方演化博弈模型的收敛。另外，除了完善对业主方和施工方的激励约束机制，还需重视公众的参与力量，提高公共文化设施建设过程的社会曝光率。

关键词：公共文化设施；项目参建方；演化博弈；激励机制

Abstract：The paper uses evolutionary game method to research the game relationship between the participants of the cultural facilities construction in China，conducts stabilization analysis respectively to strategy combinations from the two evolution models，and uses numerical simulation to show the influence that the variation of different parameters have on the strategic evolutionary trend of the owner and constructor party. Results show that the owner group driven by interests develops a tendency to irregularities，while regulatory cost restricts the effectiveness of government regulation system.“Positive incentive to the owner party”“supervision cost”“punishment strength on the constructor party’s moral hazard” three parameters affect the convergence of the owner and constructor party’s evolutionary game model. In addition，other than improving incentive and constraint mechanism to the owner and constructor party，attaching attention to the participation of the public power and enhancing public cultural facilities construction process’ social exposure are also important.

Keywords：public cultural facilities；project participants；evolutionary game；incentive mechanism

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建筑经济，2016（11）：61-65