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公租房产业化中政府、开发商和承租者的演化博弈分析
许偲 陈顺良
(中南林业科技大学土木工程与力学学院,湖南 长沙 410000)
文献要素
摘要:在演化博弈复制动态分析方法的基础上,建立公租房产业化中“政府-房地产开发商-承租者”三者之间的博弈模型,研究三者的博弈关系。研究结果表明:政府适当降低推广成本、增加处罚力度,开发商增加技术研发投入,承租者响应政府号召选择产业化公租房等,有利于推动公租房产业化发展,实现三方共赢。
关键词:公租房;产业化;演化博弈;处罚力度
Abstract:Based on replicated dynamic method of evolutionary game,the paper builds the evolutionary game model for governments,real estate developer and tenants in public rental housing industrialization,studies the game status by evolutionary game theory. The result shows that governments appropriately reduce the promotion cost,increase the intensity of punishment,developers increase investment in research and development of technology and public housing tenants response the government called for choosing industrialization,which can promote the development of industrialization of public rental housing,and realize tripartite win-win.
Keywords:public rental housing;industrialization;evolutionary game;intensity of punishment
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工程经济,2016(07):71-75
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