摘要：在公私合营项目（PPP）中，限制竞争担保作为政府担保的一种形式，分担了投资方可能面临的市场风险。然而，当市场需求超出项目承受能力时，政府则需要通过扩建以满足公众需求而违约。此时，会对投资方做出一定补偿。基于实物期权理论，限制竞争担保是一种看跌期权，具有一定价值。考虑公私双方的风险偏好，对上述期权价值进行分配，为政府设立双方都满意的补偿额度提供参考依据。

关键词：PPP项目；限制竞争担保；风险偏好；补偿额；实物期权理论

Abstract：In the Public-Private Partnership projects（PPP），restrictive competition guarantees balances the risk of market competition during project operation as a form of government guarantee. However，when the actual market demand exceeds the designed capacity of the project，the government will break the contract in order to satisfy the public needing by expansion. At this point，the government should make certain compensate to the investor. According to real option theory，restrictive competition guarantee is a kind of put option with certain values. Considering both public and privates’ risk preferences，allocating above mentioned option values，the amount of compensation which will satisfy both parties is set up. Numerical simulations illustrate that government’s risk preference is positive correlated with the compensation level.

Keywords：PPP projects；restrictive competition guarantees；risk preferences；amount of compensation；real option theory

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建筑经济，2015（02）：46-49