[摘　要]　我国目前招投标法律规定有综合评定、经评审的最低标价中标两种评标方法，实践中后者有一定局限。低价中标评标方法能否实施的关键之一在于能否设计出一种使投标人报价不得低于成本的机制。本文运用信息经济学方法对低报价投标过程中逆向选择和道德风险两种典型的信息不对称进行简要分析，参考机制设计理论，认为只要能设计出合适的机制，最低价中标是可以接受而且应该是首选的评标方法。

[关键词]　最低价中标,信息,逆向选择,机制设计

Abstract: In laws，there are two methods for appraising bid: synthetical appraising and winning bid at the lowest price by judgment， and the latter is criticized in practice. The key of realizing winning bid at the lowest price is to design a machenism that makes the bidder' price not lower than its cost. This paper analyses two typical forms of information asymmetry，adverse selection and moral hazard，and points that with appropriate machenism， the method of winning bid at the lowest price is acceptable.

Key words: winning bid at the lowest price; information; adverse selection; mechanism design

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建筑经济，2008（5）：76-78