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基于有效单位能耗的合同能源管理激励机制设计
王晛
(1.华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东 广州 510642;2.环境保护部华南环境科学研究所,广东 广州 510642)
文献要素
摘要:针对合同能源管理中节能量的认证难题,提出“有效单位能耗”的定义,据此设计激励机制,并进一步设计加入“标杆”变量的激励机制,以期为降低合同能源管理双方的风险,促进合同能源管理在更多领域的发展提供支持。
关键词:建筑能耗;合同能源管理;单位能耗;激励机制
Abstract:The definition of “effective energy consumption” is proposed to solve the difficulties in energy saving evaluation of Energy Performance Contracting. A basic incentive mechanism is designed based on this definition and further a variable “Surveyor’s Pole” is designed and added into the incentive mechanism. It is helpful for lowering the risk of both the principal and agent in Energy Performance Contracting and supporting its developing in more areas.
Keywords:building energy consumption;energy performance contracting;energy consumption per unit;incentive mechanism
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建筑经济,2014(12):97-101
 
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