[摘　要]　旨在重构高速公路项目建设管理模式，重点运用机制设计理论构建新管理模式下的激励模型。首先，运用混合策略博弈模型重点分析DBB管理模式下的寻租问题；其次，从总承包模式的新视角，构建高速公路项目建设管理模式，即BE模式（BOT+EPC）；再次，重点运用机制设计理论的新方法，设计不同情景下项目公司与承包商间的激励模型。研究表明BE模式能促进承包商主动采取价值创新活动，并能有效规避承包商的机会主义、寻租等行为；降低承包商的风险厌恶程度及其边际努力成本，提高承包商的努力水平。

[关键词]　高速公路项目；BE模式；激励机制；混合策略博弈；机制设计

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is reconstructing the model of construction and management in highway project, and focusing on building a model of motivate mechanism by using Mechanism Design Theory. Firstly, this paper analyses the rent-seeking problem by the method of mix strategy game model. Secondly, the paper reconstructs BE model (BOT+EPC) in highway project. Finally, from the perspective of Mechanism Design Theory, this paper builds a model of motivate mechanism. The results show that BE mode can promote the contractor to take value innovation behavior, and can effectively avoid the contractor's opportunism and rent-seeking behavior and so on. Lowering degree of the contractor's risk aversion and the marginal cost of effort can improve the level of efforts.

Key words: highway project; BE model；motivate mechanism; mixed strategy game; mechanism design

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