[摘　要]　大型工程一般由政府主导，投资巨大，关系国计民生，且有些工程的设计使用年限超过百年，工程质量至关重要。利用博弈论分析方法，引入朱兰最佳质量成本模型，考虑质量与成本间的补偿关系，探讨大型工程组织中业主与承包商基于质量的利益激励机制，并提出隐性声誉激励方式，对激励机制研究进行拓展。研究表明，业主通过激励机制的设计与实施来诱导承包商自觉地提高工程质量，使其与业主的目标一致，从而形成合作关系。

[关键词]　大型工程；业主；承包商；激励机制；主从递阶博弈

Abstract: Large-scale construction projects are generally led by the government, which is not only has a huge investment and closely connected with people's livelihood, but also some of the project's design life more than a hundred years, the quality of the project is essential. Based on the game theory, this paper introduces the Zhulan optimal quality-cost model through, considers the compensation relationship between quality and cost to explore the quality-based incentive mechanism of owners and contractors in large-scale construction projects, and makes a recessive reputation incentive, expands the incentives. The study shows that the owners through the design and implementation of incentives to induce contractors to consciously improve the quality of the project, make it consistent with the owner's goals, so as to form a cooperative relationship.

Key words: large-scale construction project; owner; contractor; incentive mechanism; Stackelberg game