［摘要］工程质量事故频发反映的政府质量监督失效，其本质是双重委托代理下的监督协同激励问题。工程质量政府监督两层委托面向对象不一致、下层代理人具有复杂组织结构的激励与约束机制研究尚属鲜见。据此，本文梳理和分析了多重委托代理、协同激励、工程质量政府监督激励机制研究成果及进展。

［关键词］工程质量；政府监督；多重委托代理；协同激励机制 

Abstract: The frequent engineering quality accidents reflect the government’s supervision on quality is lack of efficacy and which essential problem is the supervision coordination incentive under double agent. The research is rare that two layers of entrust face different objects and lower agent has complicated organization structure of the incentive and restraint mechanism. So, this paper sums up the research outcomes and development on multiple principal agents, cooperative incentive and the project quality supervision of the government incentive mechanism.

Key words: engineering quality; government supervision; multiple principal agent; cooperative incentive mechanism

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