[摘　要]  基于内外治理机制的双重视角，运用进化博弈理论分析城市基础设施PPP项目中政府部门和私人投资者的进化稳定策略，并分析稳定解的区间范围和影响因素，最后结合我国城市基础设施PPP项目的运营现状，提出相应的对策建议。研究表明：在单纯外部监管机制下，通过强化对机会主义行为的惩罚力度可以使系统朝着私人投资者机会主义行为概率尽可能小(y1*  =0)的方向演化，完善政府监管治理机制；在引入显性实物期权的契约治理机制下，通过强化约束条件的惩罚力度可以使系统朝着y1*  =0 的方向演化，且相对于单纯外部治理，契约治理机制扩大了y1*  =0 的稳定解空间，节约了政府部门的监管成本。

关键词：城市基础设施；PPP项目；内部治理机制；外部治理机制；进化博弈分析

Abstract: Based on double angles of internal and external governance mechanism, this paper analyzed evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) between government agents and private investors who involved in infrastructure PPP projects, and studied the interval range and influencing factors of stable solution. Finally, the operational policy, accounting for operational status was proposed. It was concluded that: we need to strengthen the punishment dynamics of opportunistic behavior for the system evolving to minimization of opportunism probability  in the circumstance of pure external monitoring mechanism, so as to improving government supervision mechanism, ‚we need to strengthen the punishment dynamics of constraints conditions for the system evolving to in the circumstance of contract governance mechanism which introduced explicit real option, internal governance mechanism expanded space of stable solution in contrast to pure external governance mechanism, and it also saved cost of supervision efficiently.

Key words: urban infrastructure; PPP projects; internal governance mechanism; external governance mechanism; evolutionary game.

建筑经济，2013（1）：67-71