您现在的位置:建筑经济>>往期回顾>2024年>第4期>>文献要素
大型工程项目分包的管控机制研究——基于交易成本的视角
花园园 刘思佳 唐吟秋 郭文倩
(1.北京建筑大学城市经济与管理学院,北京 102616;2.中国电建华东勘测设计研究院有限公司,浙江 杭州 311122;3.北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京 100044)
文献要素
摘要:对于大型工程项目而言,工程施工需要大量、多专业分包商的参与,弥补承包商在设备、专业能力及资源配置等方面的不足,进而提高项目的实施效率。与此同时,大量分包商的存在使得承包商对分包商的管理难度加大,交易成本较高,很大程度上影响承包商的投资收益。对承包商而言,采取何种措施加强对分包商的管理,从而有效控制交易成本、规避风险也成为关键问题之一。基于交易成本理论,通过对经验丰富的承包商进行半结构化访谈,分析分包商分散度与事后交易成本之间的关系,识别出工程管理实践中常用的分包管控机制:行为控制、结果控制。结合理论与实践探讨两种管控机制对事后交易成本的影响,以期为承包商在分包过程中有效控制交易成本提供针对性的建议。
关键词:工程分包;交易成本;行为控制;结果控制
Abstract:For large-scale engineering projects,engineering construction requires the participation of a large number of multi-professional subcontractors to make up for the shortcomings of contractors in equipment,professional capabilities,and resource allocation,to improve the implementation efficiency of the project. At the same time,the existence of a large number of subcontractors makes it more difficult for contractors to manage subcontractors,and the ex-post transaction cost is higher,which greatly affects the investment income of contractors. For contractors,what measures to take to strengthen the management of subcontractors,to effectively control transaction costs,and to avoid risks has become one of the key issues. Based on the transaction cost theory,through semi-structured interviews with experienced contractors,the relationship between subcontractor dispersion and post-transaction cost is analyzed,and the subcontracting control mechanisms commonly used in engineering management practice are identified:behavior control and result control. Combining theory and practice,this paper probes into the influence of two control mechanisms on post-event transaction costs,to provide specific suggestions for contractors to effectively control transaction costs in the process of subcontracting.
Keywords:subcontracting;transaction costs;behavior control;outcome control
参考文献
[1] 华冬冬,亓霞,沙凯逊.建筑业“工程分包困局”初探——为什么要超越古典政治经济学?[J].建筑经济,2022(4):5-9.
[2] 陈宏伟.关于工程分包的法与经济学分析[J].建筑经济,2021(2):5-8.
[3] BRAHM F,TARZIJáN J. Transactional hazards,institutional change,and capabilities:Integrating the theories of the firm:Integrating Theories of Firm Boundaries[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2014(2):224-245.
[4] HUI P P,DAVIS-BLAKE A,BROSCHAK J P. Managing Interdependence:The Effects of Outsourcing Structure on the Performance of Complex Projects[J/OL]. Decision Sciences,2008(1):5-31.
[5] WILLIAMSON O E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[J]. New York:The Free Press,1985:44-52.
[6] 严玲,李杰,李卓阳.交易特征、组织间控制机制与知识共享的关系:来自全过程工程咨询服务的数据[J].工程管理学报,2020(4):87-93.
[7] THOMAS NG S,TANG Z,PALANEESWARAN E. Factors contributing to the success of equipment-intensive subcontractors in construction[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2009(7):736-744.
[8] 杨海静,王晓晨.分包合同“背靠背支付”条款的司法实践与理论分析[J].建筑经济,2022(3):90-97.
[9] CHEN Y,CHEN Y,LIU Z,etal. Influence of Prior Ties on Trust in Contract Enforcement in the Construction Industry:Moderating Role of the Shadow of the Future[J]. Journal of Management in Engineering,2018(2):04017064.
[10] MANU E,ANKRAH N,CHINYIO E,etal. Trust influencing factors in main contractor and subcontractor relationships during projects[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2015(7):1495-1508.
[11] 吕俊娜,刘伟,邹庆,等.考虑公平关切的工程总承包合作利益分配模型[J].系统工程,2014(12):62-66.
[12] 李惠玲,刘雪莲,宋宸珠.基于改进TOPSIS法的EPC项目供应商评价及选择研究[J].沈阳建筑大学学报(社会科学版),2022(2):160-166.
[13] 李先光,李启明,刘颖,等.施工总承包模式下建筑供应链成本管理优化决策模型研究[J].华中科技大学学报(城市科学版),2009(1):79-84.
[14] TARZIJáN J,BRAHM F. Subcontracting in project-based firms:Do you follow the same pattern across your different projects?[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2014(6):995-1006.
[15] 程帆.控制和信任对公共项目绩效改善的影响研究[D].天津:天津理工大学,2021.
[16] TUULI M M,ROWLINSON S,KOH T Y. Control modes and mechanisms in construction project teams:drivers and consequences[J]. Construction Management and Economics,2010(5):451-465.
[17] 刘汕,张金隆,陈涛.企业IT项目控制模式对绩效的影响研究[J].科研管理,2012(7):112-120.
[18] LUO Y,ZHENG Q,JAYARAMAN V. Managing Business Process Outsourcing[J]. Organizational Dynamics,2010(3):205-217.
[19] TANG Y,CHEN Y,HUA Y,etal. Impacts of risk allocation on conflict negotiation costs in construction projects:Does managerial control matter?[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2020(3):188-199.
[20] 杜亚灵,李会玲,柯洪.工程项目中业主初始信任对合作的影响研究:承包商公平感知的中介作用[J].管理学报,2014(10):1542-1551.
建筑经济,2024(4):57-64
 
下载地址

    你还没注册?或者没有登录?这篇论文要求至少是本站的注册会员才能阅读!

    如果你还没注册,请赶紧点此注册吧!

    如果你已经注册但还没登录,请赶紧点此登录吧!