[摘　要]　基于代建人可能寻租的动机假设，通过分析代建制实施中合谋行为产生的机理，揭示了代建制实施中合谋体的类型和合谋发生的供需耦合、制度空间和社会背景原因。构建了政府、政府主管部门、代建人、承包商四者之间的博弈模型并进行了求解，得到了各方参与合谋的条件，并分析了在不同惩罚系数情况下合谋产生的条件差异，识别出防范合谋的关键政策变量。在此基础上，提出了防范代建制实施中合谋行为的机制设计建议。

[关键词]　代建制,合谋,博弈分析,监管机制,政府投资项目

Abstract: Based on motivation supposition of agent construction system contractor possibly to seek rent, by analyzing the mechanism of collusive behavior produced in the implementation of agent construction system, this paper got some types of the collusion body and the reasons of supply and demand, system spaces, and social backgrounds which bring collusion occur. The game model among the government, the government department, agent construction system contractor and contractor was built and solved, participation conditions were found about the game participator in agent construction system collusion, the differentia of collusion condition in different penalty factor was analyzed and the key policy variables for preventing collusion were put forward. On this basis above, some policy suggestions and methods were put forward in order to prevent collusion in agent construction system implementation.

Key words: agent construction system; collusion; game analysis; supervision mechanism; government investment project

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