摘要：通过构建演化博弈模型，分析养老PPP项目中政府部门和社会资本方的博弈过程，探讨抑制机会主义行为的措施和有效监管的方式。结果表明，社会资本方积极努力行为下的投机收益大小是影响机会主义行为的关键，强监管不能有效遏止机会主义行为。在此基础上，提出建议，以期推动养老PPP项目的健康发展。

关键词：养老；PPP；机会主义；监管；演化博弈

Abstract：By constructing the evolutionary game model，the paper analyzes game process of government and social capital party in the pension PPP project. And explores the measures for restraining the opportunist behavior and the ways of effective supervision. The results show that the extra income and speculative income under active efforts of social capital are keys influencing opportunistic behavior，and strong supervision can’t reduce opportunistic behavior effectively. Accordingly，puts forward some suggestions，to promote the healthy development of pension PPP projects.

Keywords：pension；PPP；opportunism；supervision；evolutionary game

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建筑经济，2019（6）：47-51