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基于博弈论的装配式建筑优惠补贴政策的稳定性和收益最大化研究
张立新 马举 何宝辉
(青岛理工大学,山东 青岛 266520)
文献要素

摘要:构建政府与企业间的博弈论模型,得出与政府政策偏离纳什均衡的结论,然后通过对模型的改进和对现实的考虑进一步完善模型,探索我国政府推出的装配式建筑优惠补贴政策基于博弈论的稳定性和效益最大化问题,并对政策的制定提出建议。
关键词:装配式建筑;博弈论;优惠补贴;稳定性
Abstract:This paper builds the game model between government and enterprises,and draws the conclusion that Nash’s equilibrium is deviated from the government’s policy. Then,based on improving the model and taking the reality into consideration,explores the stability and profit maximization of the preferential subsidy policy that China’s government has already taken based on game theory,and puts forward suggestions on policy-making.
Keywords:assembly building;game theory;preferential subsidy;stability
工程经济,2018(06):57-59

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