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建筑业资质违法借用监管策略的经济博弈分析
盛松涛 付艺丹
(长沙理工大学水利工程学院,湖南 长沙 410014)
文献要素

摘要:分析资质借出单位与借入单位的资质借用动机,建立资质借出、借入单位与政府监管部门之间的三方经济博弈模型,得出三方混合战略纳什均衡。在考虑监管成本的基础上,得到政府主管部门能有效遏制借用资质承揽工程违法行为的最优监管概率和惩罚力度,并提出运用“四库一平台”提高监管效率、降低监管成本、加大寻租成本的监督管理策略。
关键词:建筑业;资质借用;经济博弈;监管策略
Abstract:This paper analyzes the credentialing motivation of qualification of lending and borrowing units,establishes a three-way economic game model between the lending units,the borrowing units and the government regulators,obtains the three-way mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. On the basis of considering the regulatory costs,obtains the optimal regulation probability and the punishment strength which were used by government departments to effectively curb the illegal activities of borrowing qualifications,and puts forward the regulatory strategies to increase regulatory efficiency,reduce the regulatory costs,increase rent-seeking costs by using national construction market supervision and integrity distribution platform.
Keywords:construction industry;borrowing qualification;economic game;regulatory strategy
参考文献
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工程经济,2018(03):57-59

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